According to the communication record between the tower and Flight 516 and the Coast Guard aircraft released by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism on the afternoon of March 3, the Coast Guard aircraft was not given permission to take off, but only permission to ground travel to the stop position.
The aircraft was a total loss as a result of the accident; all 379 people on Flight 516 (12 crew and 367 passengers) escaped, but five of the six Coast Guard crew members were killed and one was injured. JAL also reports that one passenger on Flight 516 is bruised, one has a sprain, and 13 are unwell.
JAL’s aircraft was an Airbus A350-900 (registration code: JA13XJ).
JAL held a press conference regarding the January 2 collision between JL516 and a Japan Coast Guard aircraft at Haneda Airport. Masayuki Tsutsumi and Norimasa Aoki, Managing Executive Officers, gave an explanation.
The Escape Process
According to JAL, Flight 516 landed on Runway C at Haneda Airport at 17:47, and “there was a sudden impact after grounding” (flight crew). After the aircraft came to a complete stop, the cabin crew reported that a fire was not immediately detected in the cockpit, but they recognized the need to evacuate the aircraft. After checking the checklist for evacuation of passengers and items to be taken out of the cockpit, the three flight attendants also went outside the cockpit.
At that time, passengers had already started to escape from Doors L1 and R1, and the flight crew moved to the rear of the cabin to check for any delay in escape and found the passengers. Finally, after confirming that there was no delay in escape, they ejected through door L4. All egress was completed at 18:05, 18 minutes after landing.
Meanwhile, the flight attendants loudly administered panic control to the passengers after the collision occurred. The chief purser observed and reported to the cockpit after receiving a report that fire was visible from the left engine. At this time, the intercom at the rear of the cabin (behind row 39 name) was inoperative, and the cabin was filled with smoke due to damage from the collision, so the cabin crew started to guide passengers out of the rear door (L4) at their own discretion.
As for the reports on social networking sites that some employees were told that they could not open doors, the training includes “judging which doors can and cannot be opened,” and there is an internal policy to tell employees in a strong tone that doors that cannot be opened in an emergency are “not allowed,” and this may have been communicated verbally. This may have been the case as this was verbally communicated to the employees.
He also explained that the instructions of the flight attendants and the cooperation of the passengers “ensured that no baggage was carried during the evacuation,” which led to the speedy evacuation of all the passengers and crew.
The ejected passengers were then transported by several limousine buses to the terminal building (around 6:40 p.m.), and the situation was explained to them on the spot; the hearing started one by one around 8:40 p.m., and the earliest passengers were released after 9:00 p.m. Due to the total loss of the aircraft, it was difficult to recover baggage, including checked baggage, and these compensations are being handled on an individual basis. The company also stated that there were two pets checked in on the aircraft in question.
© Source travel watch
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