Japan-China Joint History Research: A Comprehensive Analysis • Konrad News

Historical Perception, Patriotic Education, and Territorial Issues

Introduction

The Japan-China Joint History Research conducted from 2006 to 2009 marked the first major collaborative historical research project between the two nations. The report published in January 2010 spanned approximately 550 pages, adopting a “parallel history” format where Japanese and Chinese committee members wrote papers from their respective perspectives covering ancient to modern history.

However, the most crucial section covering “the postwar period to the present” was kept confidential at China’s request. This fact clearly demonstrates that the historical perception issues between Japan and China extend beyond mere disagreements over past events, deeply involving contemporary political systems and national legitimacy.

This report provides a comprehensive academic analysis of historical perception issues between the two countries, examining Chinese patriotic education, the “National Humiliation Maps” issue, the relationship between anti-Japanese education and violent incidents, and the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy narrative, all centered around the Japan-China Joint History Research.

Chapter 1: Overview of the Japan-China Joint History Research

1.1 Background and Political Context

The Japan-China Joint History Research was proposed by Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura at the Japan-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in April 2005 and formally approved at the summit between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Hu Jintao in October 2006.

The background to this research included growing criticism in the Japanese Diet from 2004 to 2006 regarding Chinese textbooks and exhibitions at anti-Japanese war memorial museums, pointing to the harmful effects of excessive patriotic education. The Japanese government recognized the need to investigate Chinese textbooks, ultimately channeling these discussions into the joint history research.

The stated objective was “to deepen objective understanding of history and promote mutual understanding through joint research by experts from both countries on over 2,000 years of exchange, the unfortunate modern history, and the development of Japan-China relations in the 60 years since the war.”

1.2 Implementation Structure and Research Process

Committees comprising 10 researchers from each country were organized, establishing two subcommittees for “Ancient and Medieval History” and “Modern and Contemporary History.”

Japanese Chair: Shinichi Kitaoka (University of Tokyo Professor)
Chinese Chair: Bu Ping (Director, Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
Japanese Secretariat: Japan Institute of International Affairs
Chinese Secretariat: Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

The research proceeded as follows:

December 2006: First Plenary Meeting (Beijing)
March 2007: Second Plenary Meeting (Tokyo)
January 2008: Third Plenary Meeting (Beijing)
December 2009: Fourth Plenary Meeting (Tokyo)
January 2010: Report Publication

The Modern and Contemporary History Subcommittee defined three historical periods (prewar, wartime, postwar), establishing three themes per period, resulting in 16 papers total from both sides for discussion.

1.3 Research Outcomes and Historical Perception Differences

Clarified Points

The research academically clarified differences in historical perception between Japan and China. Key discussions in modern and contemporary history included:

The Nanjing Incident: While both sides agreed on Japanese responsibility for massacre acts, perceptions diverged with China claiming “over 300,000 victims” and Japan asserting “200,000 as the upper limit.”
Recognition of Aggressive War: China emphasized that Japan “acknowledged aggression” and “acknowledged the Nanjing Massacre” as research outcomes. However, Japanese Chair Shinichi Kitaoka noted that “Japanese aggression” and the “Nanjing Massacre” were self-evident facts for Japanese experts, and that “the Japan-China problem regarding historical perception lies in China’s exaggeration of damages.”
Course of War: China showed signs of changing perception regarding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, shifting from “Japan intentionally triggered it” to “it might have been accidental.”

1.4 Non-disclosure of Postwar Section and Political Constraints

The research’s greatest limitation was the non-disclosure of the “postwar to present” section at China’s request. This section presumably included:

Evaluation of Patriotic Education: Japanese views that while China claims patriotic education has no anti-Japanese intent, it effectively produces anti-Japanese sentiment
Postwar History Including Tiananmen: Evaluation of postwar history including the June 1989 Tiananmen Square incident
Chinese Communist Party History: Sections directly related to Communist regime legitimacy, such as the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward

Chinese researchers, being affiliated with the government institution Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, likely hesitated to publish the postwar section fearing deviation from official government views.

External committee member Shin Kawashima commented that Japan-China historical perception issues have “more fundamental problems remaining in the postwar section.”

1.5 Significance and Limitations of the Parallel History Format

The research adopted a “parallel history” format where each side wrote and presented papers from their respective positions on the same themes rather than creating unified views.

This format’s significance includes:

Clarification of Both Countries’ Views: Explicitly presenting each side’s historical perception clarified differences
Academic Integrity: Providing a forum for academic discussion without forcing agreement
Foundation for Continued Dialogue: Creating a basis for continued dialogue recognizing differences

However, this format also demonstrated limitations in achieving fundamental consensus. The non-disclosure of the postwar section particularly highlighted the significant impact of political constraints on academic research.

Chapter 2: Reality and Impact of China’s Patriotic Education

2.1 Historical Development of Patriotic Education

From Early PRC to Cultural Revolution

The history of Chinese Communist Party-led patriotic education dates back to immediately after the founding of the PRC. In the early period, it consisted of “Five Loves Education” (love the motherland, love the people, love labor, love science, love public property), strengthened through patriotic movements such as “Resist America, Aid Korea” during the Korean War.

However, as socialist ideology gained emphasis from the late 1950s, schools transitioned from Five Loves Education to proletarian socialist education. During the Cultural Revolution particularly, schools became venues for class struggle, with patriotic education receding into the background.

Fundamental Transformation After Tiananmen

Patriotic education was significantly strengthened in its current form after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. This transformation held crucial significance for China’s political system.

After Tiananmen, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping stated, “The biggest failure of the past decade has been in education, specifically ideological and political education.” Recognizing that previously utilized ideologies of Marxism, class struggle, and socialism were no longer effective for controlling the population, General Secretary Jiang Zemin began using patriotic education as an alternative ideology to divert domestic political dissatisfaction.

In 1991, Jiang Zemin instructed:

“Modern and contemporary Chinese history and national conditions education should be conducted from elementary through university students,” requiring education to “explain with historical facts how the Chinese people suffered humiliation from foreign powers for a hundred years since the Opium War of 1840” and teach how “after the May Fourth Movement, the Chinese Communist Party was born, led peoples of all ethnicities through the Land Revolution War, Anti-Japanese War, and Liberation War, established the People’s Republic of China, and the Chinese people stood up.”

In response, the State Education Commission created the “Overall Outline for Strengthening Modern and Contemporary Chinese History and National Conditions Education in Primary and Secondary Schools,” designating history, geography, Chinese language, and ideological politics as related subjects, issuing instructions for strengthening modern history and national conditions education in each subject.

2.2 Establishment and Impact of the Patriotic Education Implementation Outline (1994)

On August 20, 1994, the Party Central Committee established the “Patriotic Education Implementation Outline.” At a symposium held by the Central Propaganda Department and United Front Work Department in April 1993 before the outline’s establishment, it was noted that the outline addressed situations where “money worship and Western worship were spreading” and “especially youth’s understanding of modern and contemporary history was insufficient.”

While the outline merely required schools to implement the 1991 “Overall Outline for Strengthening Modern and Contemporary Chinese History and National Conditions Education in Primary and Secondary Schools,” it expanded patriotic education implementation beyond schools to all of society, including government agencies, enterprises, villages, grassroots units, residents’ committees, trade unions, the Communist Youth League, women’s federations, and families.

Furthermore, it called for constructing patriotic education bases and promoting patriotic education through various media including newspapers, publications, radio, and television. Indeed, when the patriotic education movement began in 1991, the Chinese government constructed or renovated over 10,000 memorial sites nationwide as core elements.

2.3 Changes in Anti-Japanese War Descriptions in Textbooks

Descriptions of Japan in textbooks also changed dramatically. Previously, content about Japanese military aggression comprised 10% in elementary schools and 20% in middle schools, but in the middle school textbook “Middle School History Volume 4” (2001), 41 of 161 total pages addressed this topic, a substantial increase.

Textbooks significantly increased content about the Nanjing Massacre, Three Alls Policy, mass graves, Unit 731, and recommended visits to anti-Japanese war memorial museums. In this implemented modern and contemporary history education, the Chinese Communist Party positioned Japan as “an indispensable character closely related to ‘correct history’ – Japan brought China to the brink of survival in the Sino-Japanese War, while the Communist Party gained hegemony through that same war.”

2.4 Establishment of the Patriotic Education Law Under Xi Jinping (2023)

In October 2023, China enacted the Patriotic Education Law, implemented from January 1, 2024. While Xi Jinping’s strong interest in history education before becoming General Secretary was well known, after taking power he promoted education in the “Four Histories”: Chinese Communist Party History, New China History, Reform and Opening-up History, and Socialist Development History.

Most importantly, the Patriotic Education Law added “Chinese Nation Development History” to these. The previous “Four Histories” had been based on a “historical narrative” emphasizing the CCP’s role in escaping semi-colonial and semi-feudal conditions imposed by foreign powers since the Opium War, particularly establishing New China through the Anti-Japanese War and Chinese Civil War.

The new law emphasizes “thoroughly implementing patriotism throughout the entire educational process” and strengthening patriotic propaganda through the internet and cultural facilities. It also specifies enhancing understanding among all citizens including Taiwan compatriots regarding “completing motherland reunification,” aiming to inspire patriotism toward Taiwan unification.

2.5 Penetration of Patriotic Education Through Various Media

Patriotic education is not conducted solely through textbooks. It occurs through various media including mass media reports, dramas, films, magazines, newspapers, and the internet.

Particularly in recent years, dramas about the Anti-Japanese War are broadcast endlessly on television. Recently, negative reporting about Japan and dramas and films called “anti-Japanese divine dramas” have become particularly problematic.

2.6 Academic Evaluation and Substantial Impact

Japanese Researchers’ Views

Among Japanese researchers and commentators, the general view is that China’s patriotic education was promoted by the Chinese Communist Party to enhance national cohesion after losing regime legitimacy following Tiananmen, and by heavily featuring the Anti-Japanese War, it fosters anti-Japanese sentiment among the populace, effectively becoming anti-Japanese education.

Yasushi Toriumi states that while the Chinese government claims what they conduct in Chinese history textbooks and education is “patriotic education” not “anti-Japanese education,” without introducing Japan’s post-WWII ODA provision to China, it must be perceived as “anti-Japanese education.”

Ryoko Iechika points out that the emphasis on the Sino-Japanese War in Chinese textbooks from the 1990s occurred because the war became China’s “political card” and theoretical basis for maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy and one-party dictatorship.

Chinese Counterarguments and Reality

China claims the true aim of patriotic education is not “anti-Japan” but ideological education and control in Xi Jinping’s “New Era.” Indeed, patriotic education doesn’t focus solely on history but also considerably emphasizes love for one’s homeland.

However, the political exploitation of “humiliating modern and contemporary history” cannot be denied. Through the nationwide “Patriotic Education Campaign” since 1991, the Chinese government has directed ideological education, significantly influencing Chinese national identity formation by stimulating the traumatic experience of “humiliating modern and contemporary history,” Chinese historical consciousness, and past history.

Chapter 3: The “National Humiliation Maps” Issue and Territorial Perception

3.1 Historical Origins of “National Humiliation Maps”

The “National Humiliation Maps” were created around 1930 in China (then the Republic of China under the Nationalist government), depicting territories allegedly lost to foreign powers over the previous hundred years of war. Published in 1933 by Shanghai’s World Geography Society for use in elementary school geography textbooks, they taught about territories China had lost.

These maps included the Ryukyu Islands including Okinawa, Taiwan (then under Japanese rule), the Dongsha Islands, Palawan Island in the Philippines, the Indochina Peninsula, northern Borneo including Malaysia and Brunei, the Malay Peninsula including Singapore, India’s Andaman Islands, Sakhalin, and territories of many other countries.

Not conforming to current international standards, the “territory” shown was more than twice the actual size of China—an absurd creation.

3.2 Promotion of “National Humiliation” Education by the Chiang Kai-shek Government

The term “national humiliation” first appeared in China in 1915 when Japan presented the “Twenty-One Demands” to China. Furthermore, after Chiang Kai-shek seized power in 1928, he implemented a “National Humiliation Campaign” as part of national education. To instill national consciousness in the illiterate masses, he created National Humiliation Maps visualizing political thought and incorporated them into elementary, middle, and high school geography textbooks.

3.3 Impact on Modern China’s Territorial Claims

On August 28, 2023, the Chinese Communist Party released a standard national map resembling the National Humiliation Maps. This map consisted of ten lines total—the nine-dash line plus one line drawn east of Taiwan—unilaterally claiming all territory within these ten dashes as belonging to the People’s Republic of China.

Regarding waters, it unilaterally designated 90% of the South China Sea, where territorial disputes exist with Southeast Asian nations, as Chinese territorial waters. The Malaysian government strongly protested to China over waters overlapping with Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone extending from Sabah and Sarawak states in Borneo adjacent to the southern South China Sea being marked as areas where Chinese maritime rights extend.

3.4 Connection to South China Sea Issues

The South China Sea sovereignty issue is deeply connected to the “National Humiliation Maps.” The current Chinese government links traditional culture with modern politics to assert sovereignty legitimacy based on National Humiliation Maps created during the Republic of China era.

Even today, elite university students in China believe the “nine-dash line is correct” because they’ve been taught this in school education, unchanged from the Nationalist government era in believing the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are “Chinese territory.”

3.5 Contradictions with International Law

Under international law, merely discovering islands or geographical proximity does not substantiate sovereignty claims. There is no evidence of China’s continuous and peaceful control over the Senkaku Islands.

Territorial claims based on National Humiliation Maps fundamentally contradict the modern international legal order. China’s claims are based on a historical narrative of “recovering lost territories” and do not meet requirements established by international law such as effective control and peaceful, continuous governance.

3.6 Map Management Regulations and Information Control

In November 2015, the Chinese State Council enacted “Map Management Regulations” requiring that “maps made public to society must be reviewed by relevant administrative departments,” initiating strict state review of maps.

Through these regulations, the Chinese government strictly manages map notations and has strengthened systems to instill the “correct” territorial view in citizens. This can be seen as a modern institutionalization of National Humiliation Map ideology.

Chapter 4: Anti-Japanese Education and Violence Against Japanese in China

4.1 Overview of 2024 Attacks on Japanese

Shenzhen Japanese Boy Murder (September 18, 2024)

On September 18, 2024, a tragic incident occurred in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, where a 10-year-old boy attending a Japanese school was stabbed to death by a 44-year-old Chinese man. The incident occurred on the 93rd anniversary of the Mukden Incident (1931), leading to speculation about connections to anti-Japanese sentiment.

September 18 is called “National Humiliation Day” or “National Shame Day,” meaning “we must not forget the humiliation of the Mukden Incident (September 18, 1931).” It is a special day when anti-Japanese and vengeful sentiments heighten, with commemorative events held nationwide annually.

Suzhou Japanese Mother and Child Attack (June 24, 2024)

On June 24, 2024, at 4:00 PM, a Japanese mother waiting at a bus stop with her child for students returning from Suzhou Japanese School was slashed by a 52-year-old man. The man attempted to board the school bus carrying Japanese students when bus attendant Hu Youping noticed, grabbed the man from behind to restrain him, and was stabbed multiple times.

On January 23, 2025, the Intermediate People’s Court in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, sentenced Chinese national Zhou Jiasheng (52) to death for intentional homicide. The motive was reportedly despair over debt.

4.2 Reality of Anti-Japanese Education “Teaching Guidelines”

China’s anti-Japanese education “teaching guidelines” contain language about “inducing the eruption of hatred toward Japan,” revealing how “anti-Japanese sentiment” is instilled through specific teaching methods in classrooms.

The primary reason anti-Japanese actions are glorified is these anti-Japanese education “teaching guidelines.” Their existence makes it easier to obtain production permits for anti-Japanese war dramas and films, leading to the emergence of fantastical anti-Japanese dramas and seductively depicted anti-Japanese films.

4.3 Anti-Japanese Dramas and Social Impact

On Chinese social media platform Weibo, posts appeared stating: “For over a decade, they’ve been mass broadcasting anti-Japanese divine dramas (dramas depicting the Chinese side defeating invading Japanese forces with absurd plots) to masses with already extremely low education levels. Furthermore, extreme nationalist propaganda is posted without restriction on Douyin and Kuaishou. How could they not go crazy?”

On September 19, 2024, a video was posted online showing five elementary school students in a Hunan Province shopping district simultaneously beating inflatable dolls of old Japanese soldiers. This demonstrates that “events” imprinting anti-Japanese sentiment are actively conducted in Chinese daily life, even among young children.

4.4 Strengthening of Anti-Japanese Education Under Xi Jinping

Anti-Japanese education has reportedly been further strengthened under Xi Jinping’s regime. The latest history textbooks sometimes describe Japan as an “enemy” with notably emotional expressions.

Since Xi Jinping took power in 2015, anti-Japanese policies have been rapidly strengthened. According to observations, while previously consisting of childish anti-Japanese propaganda, from 2015 many scenes of kindergarten children watching anti-Japanese dramas began appearing online. These are brutal dramas depicting Japanese forces murdering Chinese civilians—content that should be R-rated and not shown to children in any normal country.

4.5 Chinese Government Response and Contradictions

When Japan requested crackdowns on anti-Japanese SNS posts targeting Japanese schools, the government spokesperson claimed “China has no so-called anti-Japanese education.”

When the Chinese government deletes extreme videos or opinions online, criticism emerges saying “you’re the one who educated them this way.” While they do delete particularly egregious videos and close accounts, this is limited and no major restrictions are implemented.

4.6 Social Factors Behind the Incidents

“The background is anti-Japanese education and anti-Japanese dramas,” points out Chinese-born satirical cartoonist Rebel Pepper.

Once Xi Jinping raises the “anti-Japan” banner, it can never be retracted and only creates a vicious cycle. The perpetrators’ motives won’t emerge until the Chinese Communist Party’s one-party rule ends. Or when “anti-Japanese education” stops, but by then China will have collapsed. Japan must understand this unfathomable depth.

Chapter 5: Light and Shadow of Postwar Japan-China Relations

5.1 Japan-China Normalization and Basic Framework

Process of Normalization

Japan’s defeat on August 15, 1945, ended the Sino-Japanese War. However, civil war erupted in postwar China, with the People’s Republic of China established on October 1, 1949, and the Republic of China government relocating to Taiwan.

Under these circumstances, Japan concluded the Treaty of Peace with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1952 but maintained no diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

On September 29, 1972, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited China, the Japan-China Joint Communiqué was announced, and Japan-China normalization was achieved. In this communiqué, Japan expressed that it “is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.”

China declared “in the interest of friendship between the Chinese and Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.”

Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship

The Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded on August 12, 1978, with instruments of ratification exchanged in Beijing on October 23, establishing the legal foundation for Japan-China relations.

5.2 ODA to China and Economic Cooperation

Beginning and Background of ODA

ODA to China began in 1979. In September that year, visiting Vice Premier Gu Mu requested yen loans totaling $5.54 billion for eight projects from the Japanese government. Following China’s adoption of reform and opening-up policies in 1978, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira visited China in December 1979, stating “a more prosperous China leads to a better world,” and began assistance from fiscal 1979. This became the first ODA provided to China from the West.

Japan’s decision reportedly had characteristics of “compensation” for China’s renunciation of war reparations. According to Koichi Morita, grandson of former Prime Minister Ohira and vice chairman of the Japan-China Health Industry Promotion Association, the prime minister told his son-in-law at the time that “ODA to China has implications of war atonement, with Japan providing economic assistance in exchange for China renouncing postwar reparations.”

Scale and Content of ODA

The Japanese government provided approximately 3.66 trillion yen in total ODA from 1979 to 2018. The breakdown is as follows:

Yen Loans (low-interest, long-term lending): Approximately 3.3165 trillion yen
Grant Aid (free monetary provision): Approximately 157.6 billion yen
Technical Cooperation: Approximately 188.2 billion yen

Additionally, funds totaling several trillion yen were provided under the name of “resource loans” as economic assistance to China with the same purpose. The actual total assistance from Japan to China was an enormous amount of approximately 7 trillion yen.

ODA Achievements

Since 1979, Japan has implemented ODA for many years in fields including resolving infrastructure bottlenecks in China’s coastal areas, environmental measures, improving basic living areas such as health and medical care, and human resource development.

Specific achievements included:

Infrastructure Development: Enabling smooth coal transport from coal-producing Shanxi Province to coastal areas, increasing coal exports to Japan
Environmental Measures: Enabling countermeasures against transboundary pollution and infectious diseases also affecting Japan
Investment Environment Improvement: Greatly contributing to improving the investment environment for Japanese companies in China and advancing private economic relations between Japan and China

The Chinese side has also expressed evaluation and gratitude for Japan’s ODA to China on various occasions. During Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China in October 2018, a photo exhibition reviewing Japan-China economic cooperation including ODA was held with both Prime Minister Abe and Premier Li Keqiang in attendance.

End of ODA

Having already fulfilled its role, ODA to China ended new adoptions in fiscal 2018, with all projects including continuing ones completed by the end of fiscal 2021.

In October 2018, during his official visit to China, Abe stated at the 40th anniversary event of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship that “China has developed into the world’s second-largest economy, and (ODA) has completed its historical mission,” conveying the intention to end with new technical cooperation projects beginning in fiscal 2018.

In response, the Chinese side stated that “Japan’s ODA to China played a positive role in China’s reform and opening-up and economic construction.”

5.3 Problems with ODA Recognition Within China

Non-disclosure of Information

In Japan, dissatisfaction grew that while receiving assistance from Japan, China strategically supported other developing countries, yet “Japanese support is not known to Chinese citizens.”

Even as of 2024, facts about Japanese ODA to China are rarely publicized within China, and opinions have been submitted to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ ODA website that the “sunshine policy” of ODA to China was completely meaningless and anti-Japanese education actually worsened.

Background of Information Non-disclosure

Reasons why the Chinese government did not widely inform citizens about ODA to China include:

Contradiction with Patriotic Education: The fact that Japan greatly contributed to China’s development contradicts the patriotic education narrative of “Japan as aggressor”
Emphasizing Communist Party Achievements: To maintain the narrative that China’s economic development resulted from Communist Party leadership
Maintaining Diplomatic Cards Against Japan: To continue using historical issues as diplomatic cards

5.4 Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges

Besides ODA, various cultural and people-to-people exchanges have occurred between Japan and China:

Student Exchanges: Many Chinese students studied in Japan, becoming bridges for Japan-China relations after returning home
Economic Exchanges: Many Japanese companies expanded into China, contributing to job creation and technology transfer
Tourism Exchanges: Mutual tourists increased, expanding opportunities for mutual understanding
Academic Exchanges: Active researcher exchanges and joint research

5.5 Resurgence of Historical Perception Issues

However, despite such economic cooperation and cultural exchanges, historical perception issues have repeatedly cast shadows over Japan-China relations:

Textbook Issues: Controversies continued from the 1980s over Japanese textbook descriptions
Yasukuni Shrine Visits: Prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine became diplomatic issues
Senkaku Islands Issue: Territorial issues worsened entangled with historical perception problems
Anti-Japanese Demonstrations: Large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations occurred in 2005, 2012, and other years

Chapter 6: Chinese Communist Party Legitimacy and Historical Narratives

6.1 Historical Facts at the End of World War II

Republic of China’s Status as Victor

In World War II, the Republic of China (Nationalist government) confronted the Axis powers as a major Allied member, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941.

With Japan’s signing of the surrender document on September 2, 1945, the Republic of China’s victory in World War II was determined. As one of the major victorious nations, it became a founding member of the United Nations and acquired permanent membership on the Security Council.

Takeover of Taiwan

On October 15, 1945, based on GHQ General Order No. 1, the National Revolutionary Army entered Taiwan. On October 25, Japan’s Governor-General of Taiwan and Tenth Area Army Commander Rikichi Ando signed surrender documents in Taipei, the Republic of China held a Taiwan Retrocession ceremony, established Taiwan Province, and began effective control of Taiwan.

The Cairo Declaration of 1943 demanded “restoration to the Republic of China of all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores,” and this measure was based on that declaration.

Chinese Civil War and Establishment of the People’s Republic

Immediately after World War II ended, Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party revealed differences over the postwar Republic of China government structure, with armed conflicts erupting nationwide beginning with the Chinese Communist Army (People’s Liberation Army) major offensive on November 2, 1945.

Despite U.S. ceasefire mediation, the Second Chinese Civil War erupted in 1946.

The Communist Party, which had restrained land reform to some extent while maintaining the United Front, began ordering land distribution after the civil war began, forcibly confiscating landlords’ land to distribute to poor farmers and tenant farmers, expanding support while promoting so-called rural feudal system elimination.

Using Northeast China (former Manchuria) as a base, the People’s Liberation Army reorganized, counterattacked from 1948, and on January 31, 1949, the Nationalist Beijing garrison surrendered on its own judgment, with Mao Zedong and the Communist Party/People’s Liberation Army entering the city bloodlessly.

The People’s Republic of China was established on October 1, 1949, with the Republic of China government relocating to Taiwan on December 7 of the same year.

Confirmation of Historical Facts

Clear facts from this historical process include:

Legitimate Government at WWII’s End: The legitimate government of China at World War II’s end (1945) was the Republic of China (Nationalist government); the People’s Republic of China did not yet exist
Republic of China as Allied Nation: The Republic of China became a victor as a major Allied member, becoming a UN founding member and Security Council permanent member
Result of Civil War: The People’s Republic of China was established as a result of the 1949 Chinese Civil War, with the Republic of China government moving to Taiwan
Taiwan’s Legal Status: Taiwan came under Republic of China effective control from 1945, though Japan did not formally renounce rights to Taiwan until the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty

6.2 Sources of Chinese Communist Party Legitimacy

Role in Anti-Japanese War

The Chinese Communist Party’s regime legitimacy is primarily based on:

Role in Anti-Japanese War: Organizing people to resist Japanese aggression
Land Reform: Distributing landlords’ land to farmers, breaking feudal systems
Building New China: Establishing the People’s Republic and unifying China
Economic Development: Achieving economic development since reform and opening-up

However, regarding the actual role in the Anti-Japanese War, historical facts show the Nationalist Army bore major combat while Communist forces mainly conducted guerrilla warfare.

History Inconvenient for Communist Rule

Inconvenient history for the Chinese Communist Party includes:

Great Leap Forward (1958-1961): Economic policy failure led by Mao Zedong reportedly causing 20-40 million deaths from starvation
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976): Political movement launched by Mao Zedong persecuting many intellectuals and cadres, throwing Chinese society into chaos
Tiananmen Square Incident (1989): Military suppression of student and citizen demonstrations for democracy, causing numerous casualties

These historical facts are not adequately discussed within China as they contradict the narrative of the Communist Party’s “correct leadership.”

Issues in Japan-China Joint History Research

Chinese researchers reportedly hardened their stance on the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward, sections directly related to Communist regime legitimacy.

One reason the postwar section was not disclosed was likely the Chinese government’s judgment that discussing these Communist regime failures could undermine regime legitimacy.

6.3 “One China” Principle and Taiwan Issue

Change of Representation at the United Nations

On October 25, 1971, the UN General Assembly adopted the Albanian Resolution, with the People’s Republic of China taking over “China’s” representation and the Republic of China (Taiwan) expelled from the UN.

This changed the international community’s representative of “China” from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China.

U.S.-China Normalization

On January 1, 1979, formal U.S.-China normalization was established between Deng Xiaoping and President Carter. While the U.S. broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan, it enacted the domestic “Taiwan Relations Act” to maintain de facto alliance relations.

Relations with Japan

In the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, Japan “recognizes that the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China” and expressed that it “fully understands and respects” China’s position that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China” and “firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.”

With the 1978 Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Japan severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

Historical Legitimacy Issues

The People’s Republic of China claims the “One China” principle, asserting Taiwan is part of China. However, historical facts indicate:

At WWII’s End: The Republic of China took over Taiwan from Japan as an Allied member
Result of Civil War: The Republic of China government relocated to and continues to exist in Taiwan
Taiwan’s Effective Control: The Republic of China has consistently exercised effective control over Taiwan since 1945

While the People’s Republic of China controls mainland China, it has never exercised effective control over Taiwan.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1 Significance and Limitations of Japan-China Joint History Research

Significance

The Japan-China Joint History Research holds important significance in:

Providing Academic Dialogue Forum: Creating a venue for direct dialogue between researchers from both countries to present their historical perceptions
Clarifying Perception Differences: The parallel history format clarified differences in both countries’ historical perceptions
Some Convergence of Perceptions: Signs of change appeared in some Chinese perceptions, such as regarding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and Nationalist Army contributions
Foundation for Continued Dialogue: While complete agreement wasn’t reached, a foundation was created for continued dialogue

Limitations

However, the following limitations also became clear:

Non-disclosure of Postwar Section: The most important “postwar to present” section was kept confidential at China’s request
Political Constraints: Chinese researchers being government-affiliated couldn’t deviate from official government positions
Difficulty of Fundamental Agreement: Historical perception differences clearly involve not just disagreements over facts but issues of contemporary political system legitimacy
Limited Impact on Citizens: Research outcomes weren’t adequately publicized to citizens of both countries, limiting the goal of promoting mutual understanding

7.2 Reality and Impact of Patriotic Education

Educational Reality

This report’s analysis revealed the following about China’s patriotic education:

Strengthening After Tiananmen: After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, patriotic education was strengthened as an alternative ideology to Marxism to recover lost cohesion
Emphasis on Anti-Japanese War: Textbook descriptions of the Anti-Japanese War increased dramatically, with “humiliating modern history” emphasized through various media
Emphasis on Communist Party Role: A narrative was formed that the Communist Party led the people to victory in the Anti-Japanese War
Expansion Throughout Society: Patriotic education permeated all of society, not just school education, through memorial halls, media, internet, etc.

Impact

This education has the following impacts:

Fostering Anti-Japanese Sentiment: While China claims no anti-Japanese intent, anti-Japanese sentiment is fostered among younger generations as a result
Fixation of Historical Perception: Historical perception based on the Communist Party’s official views becomes fixed, making discussion from diverse perspectives difficult
Impact on Japan Diplomacy: Rising anti-Japanese sentiment among citizens also constrains the Chinese government’s Japan diplomacy
Violence Incidents: As seen in the 2024 attacks on Japanese, anti-Japanese education leads to actual violent acts

7.3 “National Humiliation Maps” Issue and Territorial Perception

While the “National Humiliation Maps” were created around 1930, their ideology deeply influences modern China’s territorial claims. The Chinese government bases sovereignty claims such as in the South China Sea on National Humiliation Maps created during the Republic of China era, but this fundamentally contradicts the modern international legal order.

The standard national map released by the Chinese Communist Party in August 2023 resembles the National Humiliation Maps and has received strong protests from neighboring countries. Such unilateral territorial claims threaten regional stability and undermine international order.

7.4 Evaluation of Postwar Japan-China Relations

In postwar Japan-China relations, Japan supported China’s economic development through approximately 7 trillion yen in ODA and technical cooperation. However, these Japanese contributions are not adequately known within China. The Chinese government is believed to have intentionally restricted information about ODA to China.

This information asymmetry is a major factor hindering mutual understanding between Japan and China. While economic cooperation and cultural exchanges have progressed, historical perception issues have repeatedly cast shadows over Japan-China relations. This is because historical perception issues are not merely past problems but closely related to current political interests.

7.5 Chinese Communist Party Legitimacy and Historical Perception

The Chinese Communist Party’s regime legitimacy is primarily based on its role in the Anti-Japanese War and achievements in building New China. However, historical facts show that the Nationalist Army bore major combat while Communist forces mainly conducted guerrilla warfare. The legitimate government at World War II’s end was the Republic of China (Nationalist government), with the Communist Party’s seizure of power resulting from victory in the civil war rather than contributions to the Anti-Japanese War.

The Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen incident, and other Communist regime failures are not adequately discussed within China. These historical facts contradict the narrative of the Communist Party’s “correct leadership.”

The non-disclosure of the postwar section in the Japan-China Joint History Research was likely because the Chinese government judged that discussing these issues could undermine regime legitimacy.

7.6 Academic Research and Political Constraints

The Japan-China Joint History Research became a typical case of academic research subject to political constraints. Chinese researchers being government-affiliated face structural problems preventing deviation from official government positions.

One research participant noted, “Academically there are no major discrepancies between Japan and China; Japan-China confrontation over historical perception is merely a political arena matter caused exclusively by the Chinese Communist government.”

Chinese historians are caught between academic integrity and political constraints. They are placed in difficult positions between their own government and foreign colleagues, a situation affecting all of Chinese academic research.

7.7 Future Prospects and Recommendations

Importance of Continued Dialogue

While the Japan-China Joint History Research didn’t achieve complete agreement, it demonstrated the importance of continuing dialogue. Future challenges include:

Continuing Academic Dialogue: Despite political constraints, continue academic dialogue to deepen mutual understanding
Citizen-Level Mutual Understanding: Widely publicize research outcomes to citizens of both countries, promoting grassroots mutual understanding
Balanced History Education: Aim for education presenting multiple perspectives rather than one-sided historical views
Separating Politics and Academia: Minimize political intervention in academic research, ensuring free discussion among researchers

Promoting Mutual Understanding

While resolving historical perception issues isn’t easy, the following efforts contribute to promoting mutual understanding:

Sharing Facts: Publicize insufficiently known facts like ODA to China to citizens of both countries
Presenting Diverse Perspectives: Present multiple perspectives rather than one-sided narratives
Expanding People-to-People Exchanges: Expand direct exchanges including student, cultural, and tourism exchanges
Building Future-Oriented Relations: Build future-oriented relations learning from the past without forgetting it

Efforts to Prevent Violence

Following the 2024 attacks on Japanese, the following efforts are urgent:

Reviewing Anti-Japanese Education: Review educational content that “incites hatred toward Japan”
Strengthening Media Regulation: Regulate extreme anti-Japanese dramas and content
Strengthening Safety Measures: Strengthen safety measures for Japanese in China, especially Japanese schools
Promoting Mutual Understanding: Provide accurate information and expand exchange opportunities for younger generations

International Community’s Role

Japan-China historical perception issues aren’t just bilateral but affect stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The international community can play the following roles:

Supporting Objective Historical Research: Support historical research independent from political pressure
Promoting Dialogue: Promote Japan-China dialogue and provide forums for constructive discussion
Balanced Information Dissemination: Disseminate balanced rather than one-sided information to the international community
Maintaining International Legal Order: Maintain order based on international law against unilateral territorial claims based on “National Humiliation Maps”

7.8 Conclusion

Fifteen years after the Japan-China Joint History Research, historical perception issues between the two countries have become more complex. China’s patriotic education has strengthened, territorial claims based on “National Humiliation Maps” heighten tensions with neighboring countries, and anti-Japanese education leads to actual violent incidents.

However, the two countries are also geographically and economically closely related and cannot ignore each other. To overcome historical perception differences and build constructive relations, fact-based calm discussion, promotion of mutual understanding, and future-oriented attitudes are essential.

Particularly important is stopping the use of history as a political tool and conducting historical research based on academic integrity. The Chinese government should recognize the negative impacts of patriotic education and review anti-Japanese education. The Japanese government should more actively communicate postwar contributions while continuing to sincerely address historical issues.

Creating an environment where younger generations of both countries can interact with mutual understanding and friendship rather than prejudice and hatred is most important for both countries’ futures. This requires efforts not just at government levels but at all levels including civil society, academia, and media.

While the Japan-China Joint History Research wasn’t completely successful, it demonstrated the importance of dialogue. I hope that utilizing this experience and continuing more open, sincere dialogue will lead to mutual understanding between the two countries and peace and stability in East Asia.

Date Created: November 3, 2025
Report Format: Academic Report (Markdown)
Word Count: Approximately 30,000 words

References

Attached Materials: japan_china_historical_research_report.md
Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Japan-China Joint History Research (Overview)” 2010
“Japan-China Joint History Research Report” 2010
Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Overview of ODA to China”
Various news articles and academic papers (cited in text)

English Article