— Analysis of Gradual Status Quo Changes Through Salami-Slicing Tactics —
Date: November 8, 2025
Executive Summary
This report analyzes China’s “salami-slicing tactics” and “cabbage tactics” for gradually changing the status quo around the Senkaku Islands, demonstrating that these constitute a serious challenge to peace and stability in East Asia and to the rule-based international order itself.
Since 2008, China has been implementing a strategy of accumulating small actions that individually do not trigger war, gradually eroding Japan’s effective control. This method has proven successful in the South China Sea, and a similar pattern is now unfolding around the Senkaku Islands. The international community must accurately recognize the reality of this “silent invasion” and cooperate to maintain a rule-based maritime order.
Chapter 1: Legal Status of the Senkaku Islands
1.1 Japan’s Territorial Sovereignty Under International Law
Historical Background
The Senkaku Islands were formally incorporated into Japanese territory on January 14, 1895, through a Cabinet decision based on the doctrine of “occupation of terra nullius” under international law. Between 1885 and 1895, the Japanese government conducted repeated on-site surveys over a ten-year period, carefully confirming the following facts before deciding on territorial incorporation:
- The Senkaku Islands were uninhabited
- There were no traces of Qing Dynasty control
- No state exercised governance over the islands
This incorporation was completely separate from Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, which were ceded by the Qing Dynasty under the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 1895), and was unrelated to the Sino-Japanese War. After incorporation, Japanese civilians obtained government permission to settle on the Senkaku Islands, engaging in industrial activities such as operating bonito processing plants and collecting albatross feathers. At its peak, 248 Japanese people lived on Uotsuri Island alone, with schools and shrines built, and taxes collected.
International Recognition
In May 1920, when fishermen from Fujian Province were shipwrecked near Uotsuri Island, Japanese residents rescued them. In recognition of this rescue, the Consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki issued letters of appreciation explicitly stating “Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama County, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan.” This is clear evidence that the government of the Republic of China officially recognized the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territory.
Official Recognition by the Republic of China: The 1920 Letter of Appreciation Incident
On December 26, 1919 (Taisho 8), the fishing vessel Kingoumaru, carrying 31 fishermen from Huian County, Quanzhou Prefecture, Fujian Province, Republic of China (including men, women, and children), led by Guo Heshun, encountered a severe storm while engaged in fishing off Zhejiang Province and became distressed. After drifting for five days, on the evening of December 30, they landed on Uotsuri Island in the Senkaku Islands (then also called “Heiwa-jima” or “Wayou-jima”) using a small boat.
Fortunately, there was a bonito processing plant on Uotsuri Island operated by Mr. Yoshiji Koga, with about 30 Japanese workers. The factory personnel rescued all 31 distressed persons and shared their stored food with them. After the weather improved on January 10, 1920, the distressed persons were transported to Ishigaki Village Office by a fishing vessel owned by Koga Trading Company. Following negotiations between Ishigaki Village Office and the Consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki, on January 21, the 31 persons departed for Keelung, Taiwan, on the Osaka Shosen Yaeyama-maru, and on the 25th, they safely returned to Fuzhou via Xiamen from Keelung on the Osaka Shosen Amakusa-maru.
In recognition of this rescue operation, on May 20, 1920, Feng Mian, Consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki, presented letters of appreciation to seven Japanese individuals involved, including Zenzo Toyokawa, village head of Ishigaki, Sonban Tamayose, an employee of Ishigaki Village, and Yoshiji Koga.
Content of the Letter of Appreciation (Translation from Original)
“In the winter of the eighth year of the Republic of China, thirty-one fishermen from Huian County, Fujian Province, led by Guo Heshun, encountered a storm and drifted to Wayou Island within the Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama County, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan. Mr. Zenzo Toyokawa, village head of Ishigaki Village, Yaeyama County, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan, enthusiastically rescued them and enabled their safe return to their homeland. This letter is presented to express our gratitude.”
Historical Significance
This letter of appreciation is extremely important historical evidence for the following reasons:
- Official Document of the Republic of China Government: Issued by a diplomatic official, the Consul in Nagasaki, it represents the official recognition of the Republic of China government.
- Clear Territorial Recognition: The explicit mention of “Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama County, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan” proves that the Chinese side recognized the Senkaku Islands as part of Japan’s administrative divisions.
- Absence of Objection: Even after the issuance of this letter of appreciation, for 51 years until 1971, neither China (neither the Republic of China nor the People’s Republic of China) raised any objection to the Senkaku Islands being Japanese territory.
- Multiple Surviving Documents: Of the seven letters of appreciation, two originals (addressed to Zenzo Toyokawa and Sonban Tamayose) are currently confirmed to exist and are preserved at the Yaeyama Museum in Ishigaki City. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs records document the sending of all seven letters.
This letter of appreciation is one of the clearest pieces of evidence that China itself recognized the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territory until China suddenly began claiming territorial rights in 1971.
Under the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951), the Senkaku Islands were not included in the territories Japan renounced and were placed under U.S. administration as part of the Nansei Islands. When Okinawa was returned to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement of 1972, the Senkaku Islands were included among the other Okinawan islands whose administrative rights were returned to Japan. Throughout this entire process, China raised no objections.
1.2 China’s Initiation of Territorial Claims
Sudden Policy Reversal in 1971
China (the People’s Republic of China) officially began claiming territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in December 1971, while Taiwan (the Republic of China) began in April 1971. This timing came immediately after a United Nations agency survey indicated the possible existence of oil resources on the continental shelf of the East China Sea.
For the preceding 75 years, China had raised no objections whatsoever to Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. An official map published by the People’s Republic of China in 1969 labeled the Senkaku Islands with their Japanese name “Senkaku Gunto” (Senkaku Islands), and the People’s Daily also used the Japanese name “Senkaku Retto.” These facts indicate that China itself recognized the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territory.
Problems Under International Law
The act of remaining silent about another country’s annexation of territory for 75 years, then suddenly claiming territorial rights after the discovery of resources, clearly violates the principle of “estoppel” in international law—the principle that a state that has acquiesced for a long period cannot later make contradictory claims.
Chapter 2: China’s Gradual Status Quo Change Tactics
2.1 The Concept of Salami-Slicing Tactics
Definition and Origin
“Salami-slicing tactics” refers to a method of gradually accumulating small actions, like thinly slicing salami sausage, where each individual action does not trigger war, but over time achieves major strategic changes. This concept derives from the words of Hungarian Communist Party leader Mátyás Rákosi, embodying the strategic philosophy that “if you change the situation little by little, resistance will be minimal.”
China successfully deployed these tactics in the South China Sea, establishing effective control by reclaiming reefs, constructing artificial islands, and militarizing them. A similar pattern is now unfolding around the Senkaku Islands.
Application of Classical Chinese Military Strategy
Behind China’s salami-slicing tactics lies strategic thinking based on classical military philosophy:
- Yi yi dai lao (以逸待労): Exhaust the enemy while maintaining one’s own strength
- Da cao jing she (打草驚蛇): Strike the grass to startle the snake (test the opponent’s reaction)
- Yu qin gu zong (欲擒姑縱): Give nominal freedom while gradually tightening control to force submission
By applying these stratagems to modern maritime expansion, China attempts to achieve gray-zone dominance through “winning without fighting.”
2.2 Phased Escalation Around the Senkaku Islands
Since December 2008, China has systematically and gradually strengthened its activities around the Senkaku Islands. The following timeline shows this development:
Phase 1: Normalization of Contiguous Zone Intrusions (2008~)
In December 2008, two vessels belonging to China’s State Oceanic Administration suddenly intruded into the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. This marked the beginning of territorial water intrusions by Chinese government vessels. Subsequently, they repeated intrusions into the contiguous zone, observing Japanese responses while increasing frequency.
In 2023, navigation within the contiguous zone reached a record high of 334 days, normalizing a situation where Chinese government vessels were present in the contiguous zone almost daily.
Phase 2: Regularization of Territorial Water Intrusions (2012~)
Following the Japanese government’s nationalization of the Senkaku Islands in 2012, China escalated territorial water intrusions. Initially occurring about once a month, these intrusions gradually increased and are now conducted regularly.
In April 2023, an intrusion by four China Coast Guard vessels lasted over 80 consecutive hours, setting a record. This represents not mere “patrolling” but intentional actions designed to weaken Japan’s effective control.
Phase 3: Armament Enhancement and Larger Vessels (2016~)
The armament of China Coast Guard vessels has been progressively strengthened each year. Initially mainly vessels equipped with 30mm machine guns, since entering the 2020s, large ships equipped with 76mm rapid-fire guns have been deployed.
The 76mm rapid-fire gun possesses firepower far exceeding the 40mm machine gun, the largest caliber mounted on Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels. In February 2024, all four vessels entering the contiguous zone were equipped with 76mm guns, testing Japanese reactions. With no strong pushback, China decided to further intensify its activities.
Phase 4: Intimidation of Japanese Fishing Vessels (2018~)
Several years ago, China Coast Guard vessels began chasing Japanese fishing vessels during territorial water intrusions. This represents an escalation from mere territorial water intrusion to interfering with Japanese fishing activities and instilling in Japanese fishermen a perception that “the waters around Senkaku are dangerous.”
If Japanese fishermen abandon operations around the Senkaku Islands, one important element of Japan’s effective control would be lost.
Phase 5: Airspace Violations (2023~)
Since 2023, China has also begun violating Senkaku Islands airspace with China Coast Guard helicopters. This represents an attempt to apply pressure not only from the sea but also from the air, constructing a three-dimensional encirclement.
The 9th Air Wing of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force conducted 515 scrambles against Chinese military aircraft in fiscal year 2022, with nearly half aimed at deterring Chinese military aircraft approaching Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol aircraft. Such a tense sea and air domain cannot be found anywhere else in the world.
2.3 Cabbage Tactics: Multi-Layer Encirclement Strategy
Structure of the Tactics
“Cabbage tactics” refers to a method of surrounding target islands or maritime areas with multiple layers, like the many leaves of a cabbage. China uses warships, law enforcement vessels, and fishermen as maritime militia, with various organizations operating under tight coordination.
The multi-layer structure around the Senkaku Islands is as follows:
- Innermost Layer: Maritime militia (armed fishing vessels, 250-vessel scale)
- Middle Layer: Coast guard vessels (armed public vessels with 76mm guns)
- Outer Layer: Naval vessels (on standby)
- Airspace: Military aircraft and helicopters
Reality of Civil-Military Fusion
Chinese fishing vessels are not mere civilian vessels. Many are organized as “maritime militia,” equipped with communications equipment and radar, operating based on government instructions. In 2016, an incident occurred where 250 Chinese fishing vessels swarmed around the Senkaku Islands—this was clearly not “coincidental” but organized action.
The China Coast Guard was incorporated into the People’s Armed Police Force in 2018, coming under the command of the Central Military Commission. This gave coast guard vessels essentially the character of warships. However, because they are painted white as “law enforcement vessels,” China can claim these are “law enforcement activities” rather than “military operations.” This is the essence of “gray-zone tactics.”
Chapter 3: Exhausting Japan Through a War of Attrition
3.1 Costs to Japan
Burden on the Japan Coast Guard
To respond to China Coast Guard activities, the Japan Coast Guard maintains patrol vessels around the Senkaku Islands at all times. In 2023, with Chinese government vessels present in the contiguous zone for 334 days, JCG patrol vessels needed to maintain surveillance for 334 days as well.
This continuous surveillance generates the following costs:
- Increased fuel expenses
- Vessel wear and repair costs
- Mental and physical fatigue of crew members
- Reduced patrol capacity in other maritime areas
- Budget pressure from patrol vessel construction and enhancement
Burden on the Japan Air Self-Defense Force
With increased Chinese military aircraft activity, the JASDF’s scramble frequency has surged. Emergency launches require maintaining a 24-hour ready response capability, placing enormous burdens on pilots and maintenance crews.
- Increased aircraft wear from flight hours
- Rising jet fuel costs
- Accumulated pilot fatigue
- Reduced training time
- Impact on emergency response capability
3.2 Cultivating “Habituation” and “Sense of Powerlessness”
China’s salami-slicing tactics aim to instill “habituation” and a “sense of powerlessness” in Japan.
Dangers of “Habituation”
China Coast Guard territorial water intrusions, initially reported as major news, have now become routine, with media coverage diminishing. Most citizens are unaware that tense situations continue daily around Senkaku.
When this “habituation” occurs, even if China takes a further step (such as landing), reactions may be limited to “here we go again,” losing the political and public opinion foundation necessary for taking strong countermeasures.
Strategic Effect of “Sense of Powerlessness”
As the situation continues where China’s actions do not stop despite Japan’s repeated protests, a sense of powerlessness spreads among the Japanese people that “nothing we do makes a difference.” This sense of powerlessness aims to ultimately cause abandonment of resistance.
In the South China Sea, despite strong protests from the Philippines and Vietnam, China completed reef reclamation and militarization. This “success story” gives China confidence that similar tactics will be effective in the East China Sea.
Chapter 4: Challenge to International Order
4.1 Erosion of the Rule of Law
Ignoring International Law
China’s actions around the Senkaku Islands clearly violate the following principles of international law:
- UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: While innocent passage through territorial waters is recognized, China Coast Guard actions cannot be considered “innocent.” Armed public vessels pursuing Japanese fishing vessels clearly threaten Japan’s sovereignty and security.
- Principle of Estoppel: The act of acquiescing to Japan’s sovereignty for 75 years, then suddenly claiming territorial rights, violates the principle of good faith in international law.
- Prohibition of Threat or Use of Force: Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force. Demonstrations by coast guard vessels equipped with 76mm guns may violate this principle.
Ignoring the South China Sea Ruling
In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that China’s claims based on the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea had no legal basis. However, China completely ignored this international judicial decision as “waste paper,” continuing militarization of the South China Sea afterward.
This precedent represents a challenge to the international dispute resolution mechanism itself based on international law. If China’s actions are acquiesced to by the international community, it sends the wrong message worldwide that “status quo changes by force” are possible.
4.2 Threat to Regional Peace and Stability
Risk of Accidental Conflict
Around the Senkaku Islands, Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels and China Coast Guard vessels confront each other at close range, with frequent close encounters between JASDF and Chinese military aircraft becoming routine. In such situations, there is a constant risk that minor misjudgments or accidents could escalate into serious military conflict.
Scenarios of particular concern include:
- China Coast Guard vessels colliding with Japanese fishing vessels, causing casualties
- Accidents from abnormally close approaches between Chinese military aircraft and SDF aircraft
- Landing on Senkaku Islands under the pretext of “distress” by Chinese maritime militia
Linkage with Taiwan Contingency
The Senkaku Islands are located approximately 170 kilometers from Taiwan. In the event of a Taiwan contingency, China would likely attempt to militarily seize the Senkaku Islands to hinder U.S. intervention and block supply routes to Taiwan.
In other words, the Senkaku issue is not an isolated territorial dispute but is inseparably linked to Taiwan contingency and the security of all of East Asia. China’s accumulation of fait accompli around the Senkaku Islands has the effect of advantaging China’s military operations in a future Taiwan contingency.
4.3 Impact on World Order
Danger of Precedent
If China’s salami-slicing tactics around the Senkaku Islands succeed, it will present a dangerous precedent to authoritarian countries worldwide that “territorial expansion is possible by ignoring international law through accumulating small actions.”
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China’s actions in the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands issue all share the common feature of “status quo change by force.” If these are tolerated, the foundation of the international order established after World War II will collapse.
Threat to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Japan’s proposed “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision aims for a regional order based on rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade. China’s actions around the Senkaku Islands directly oppose this vision.
If China’s “status quo change by force” succeeds in the East China Sea, there are concerns that similar actions will expand to the South China Sea and further to the Indian Ocean. This would undermine the foundation of peace and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
Chapter 5: Response by Japan and the International Community
5.1 Maintaining Japan’s Effective Control
Continuation of Law Enforcement Activities
“Effective control” under international law does not mean merely the physical presence of coast guard vessels, but rather the exercise of governance through legislative, administrative, and judicial acts from a sovereign position.
Since the incorporation of the Senkaku Islands, Japan has continued the following governance acts:
- Fishery management (application of Fisheries Act)
- Public safety maintenance (security by Japan Coast Guard)
- Tax administration (taxation of fixed assets)
- Land registry management (Ishigaki City, Tonoshiro, Senkaku)
- Management as national land
Each time China Coast Guard vessels intrude into territorial waters, the JCG warns that it constitutes a violation of international law and orders them to leave territorial waters in accordance with law. This consistent response is proof of Japan’s exercise of sovereignty and demonstrates the continuation of effective control.
Calm Yet Resolute Response
The Japanese government maintains a calm yet resolute response to China’s provocative actions. It is important to continue law-based responses without overreacting and causing escalation, yet never compromising.
This maintenance of “managed tension” may not show short-term results, but is a strategic response that contributes to long-term regional stability.
5.2 Cooperation with Allies and Friendly Countries
Confirmation of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
The U.S. government has repeatedly confirmed that the Senkaku Islands are subject to Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. This was reconfirmed at the Japan-U.S. summit in February 2025.
However, the U.S. maintains a neutral position that it is not in a position to judge the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. The Japan-U.S. alliance defends “areas under Japan’s administration,” and if Japan loses effective control, there is a possibility that the U.S. defense obligation may not be triggered.
Cooperation with the Quad (Japan-U.S.-Australia-India)
The Quad, consisting of Japan, the United States, Australia, and India, cooperates toward realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” While the Senkaku issue is a bilateral issue between Japan and China, the underlying confrontation between “rule of law” versus “status quo change by force” is a regional challenge.
Quad countries deter China’s unilateral status quo changes through freedom of navigation operations, joint exercises, and information sharing.
Appeal to International Public Opinion
Japan needs to continue disseminating the reality of China’s actions to the international community. The following points should be clearly communicated:
- China recognized the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territory for 75 years until 1971
- Suddenly began claiming territorial rights after the discovery of oil resources
- Attempting to gradually change the status quo through salami-slicing tactics
- This is the same pattern as in the South China Sea
- This is a challenge to the rule-based international order
5.3 Utilizing China’s Structural Vulnerabilities
Exposing Statistical Falsification
In recent years, serious doubts have arisen regarding China’s population statistics and GDP statistics.
- The 2022 Shanghai police data leak incident suggests China’s actual population may be around 1 billion rather than the officially announced 14 billion
- According to Brookings Institution research, China may have inflated GDP growth rates by an average of about 2 percentage points from 2008 to 2016
- Liaoning Province, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Tianjin have successively officially admitted to GDP inflation
These facts suggest that China has expanded its influence by presenting the international community with a false image of a “1.4 billion market” and “world’s second-largest economy.” By making the international community aware of China’s “paper tiger” aspects, Japan can restrain excessive expectations and investment in China and long-term constrain China’s capacity for external expansion.
Utilizing Time
China faces serious structural problems including rapid aging, real estate bubble collapse, and rising youth unemployment. The total fertility rate of 1.09 is far below the level needed to maintain the population.
While awaiting China’s weakening, it is important for Japan to reliably maintain effective control of the Senkaku Islands. However, “waiting alone” is insufficient—active responses are needed to prevent China from accumulating fait accompli during this time.
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 The Essence of the Senkaku Islands Issue
The Senkaku Islands issue is not merely a territorial dispute between Japan and China. It poses a more fundamental question: whether the international community of the 21st century will be governed by the rule-based order or by status quo changes through force.
China’s salami-slicing tactics are sophisticated in that they “accumulate fait accompli little by little within a range that does not lead to war.” But precisely for this reason, the international community must accurately recognize the reality of this “silent invasion” and take clear countermeasures at an early stage.
6.2 Recommendations
Recommendations for the Japanese Government
- Strengthen Effective Control: Consider expanding administrative activities on the Senkaku Islands (weather observation, marine surveys, etc.). However, careful judgment is needed to avoid giving China a pretext for use of force.
- Strengthen Information Dissemination: Continuously disseminate China’s actions to the international community, advocating the importance of “rule of law.” Particularly effective would be visualizing the phased development of salami-slicing tactics and showing similarities with the South China Sea.
- Enhance Maritime Security Capacity: Build a sustainable security system through increasing patrol vessels, modernizing equipment, and improving crew treatment.
- Deepen Cooperation with Allies and Friendly Countries: While maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance as the foundation, strengthen regional security cooperation utilizing frameworks such as the Quad and AUKUS.
- Analyze and Publicize China’s Vulnerabilities: Make the international community aware of falsification in China’s population and economic statistics, dismantling the myth of a “1.4 billion market.”
Recommendations for the International Community
- Reaffirm Importance of Rule of Law: China’s actions ignoring the South China Sea arbitration ruling should not be tolerated. Reaffirm the importance of international law-based dispute resolution.
- Clear Message to China: Convey a clear message to China through diplomatic and economic means that the international community will not tolerate status quo changes by force.
- Ensure Freedom of Navigation: To ensure freedom of navigation in the East China Sea, concerned countries should continue regular patrol activities.
- Reconsider Economic Interdependence: Recognize strategic risks posed by excessive economic dependence on China and promote supply chain diversification.
6.3 Final Considerations
China’s gradual approach to the Senkaku Islands is an ongoing challenge to the international order. If this challenge is left unaddressed, it will invite similar “status quo changes by force” not only in East Asia but worldwide.
Japan must counter this challenge through continuation of rule of law and effective control. Simultaneously, it is necessary to continue appealing to the international community that the Senkaku issue is not merely a dispute over rocks but a matter related to the foundation of 21st-century international order.
Against “salami-slicing” tactics, a resolute stance that does not permit each thin slice, combined with strategic patience from a long-term perspective, is required. Time is not necessarily on China’s side. While keeping China’s structural vulnerabilities in view, continuing law and justice-based responses is the path to ultimate victory.
References
Primary Sources
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Basic View on the Senkaku Islands”
- Cabinet Secretariat, Territorial Sovereignty Response Office, “Materials Concerning the Senkaku Islands”
- Japan Coast Guard, “Activities of China Coast Guard Vessels Around the Senkaku Islands”
- Ministry of Defense, “Defense White Paper” (various years)
- Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, “Research Reports on Senkaku Islands”
- The Brookings Institution, “A Forensic Examination of China’s National Accounts” (2019)
- Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Ocean Policy Research Institute, “Japan’s Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands”
Data Sources
- Number of China Coast Guard territorial water intrusions: Japan Coast Guard published data
- Days of contiguous zone navigation: Japan Coast Guard published data
- JASDF scramble frequency: Ministry of Defense Joint Staff published data
- China population statistics: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Shanghai Police data leak incident analysis
- China GDP statistics: Brookings Institution, joint research by Chinese University of Hong Kong and University of Chicago
Contact Regarding This Report
This report is an independent analysis based on publicly available sources. You are free to reproduce and quote its contents, provided proper attribution is given. We welcome information sharing with all those interested in the Senkaku Islands issue and peace and stability in East Asia.
Prepared: November 8, 2025